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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Defining a Feasible
Culpability Threshold for the Imposition of
Severe Discovery Sanctions
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, inefficiencies in the discovery phase of federal litigation have been increasingly perceived as an obstacle
to justice.' Intransigent or merely careless delays in litigants'
compliance with discovery orders often so lengthen the pretrial
phase of civil litigation that a final decision on the merits seems
a remote possibility. 2 Traditionally, courts have imposed the
ultimate litigation-ending sanctions authorized under rule 37 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules)3 only in
the clearest cases of intentional discovery abuse. In other
cases courts have imposed minimum sanctions, severe enough
to persuade the delaying party to expedite the discovery process and to compensate the discovering party for the effects of
the delay.4
More recently the federal courts have toughened their attitude toward discovery delays and have imposed litigation-ending sanctions in an attempt to compel litigants and their
attorneys to comply with discovery orders. 5 At least two courts
have imposed litigation-ending discovery sanctions for less
6
than intentional failures to comply with discovery orders, suggesting that "intent" may no longer be the culpability threshold. This increased use of litigation-ending sanctions raises a
significant normative question: what degree of culpability
should be required before a court may impose such sanctions?
1.

See generallyW. BURGER, 1979 YEAR-END REPORT (1980); Ebersole, Dis-

covery Problems: Is Help on the Way?, 66 A.B.A. J.50 (1980).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 712-13
(D. Minn. 1976), affid, 543 F.2d 1210, 1211-12 (8th Cir. 1976) (defendant Reserve
Mining was assessed $200,000 discovery sanction for failure to obey discovery
order; violations were deemed part of defendant's course of conduct adopted in
bad faith for the sole purpose of delaying final resolution of pollution control
controversy).
3. Rule 37 provides sanctions of varying severity-from awarding costs to
dismissing the action. See FED. L Cirv. P. 37(b).
4. See notes 24-29 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 36-37 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 44-49 infra and accompanying text.
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This Note will review case law developments and will analyze some of the problems associated with the lower culpability
threshold that has been applied in recent cases. The Note concludes that the use of a lower level of culpability cannot deter
discovery order noncompliance at the present time without
compromising the fundamental goal of the Federal Rules: to
provide litigants with a fair opportunity to have their disputes
promptly decided on the merits. The proposals for discovery
reforms and changes in the Federal Rules, the local court rules,
and the Federal Magistrates Act that are advanced in this Note
will increase litigational efficiency by forcing courts and magistrates to clarify the litigants' duties. 7 Adoption of these proposed reforms will also permit the fair imposition of a reduced
culpability threshold.
II.

THE PROBLEM

The discovery procedures outlined in the Federal Rules
were drafted to enable parties to limit trials to issues genuinely
in dispute, to ascertain and preserve facts in preparation for
trial, and to lay a foundation for settlement or summary judgment. The primary goal of the procedures was to eliminate the
egregious aspects of the adversary system-surprise, partisan
expert witnesses, overly dramatic cross-examinations, and excessive contentiousness-that underlie the "sporting theory of
8
justice."
Modern pretrial discovery in federal litigation is conducted
on a relatively informal basis; written judicial orders are usually unnecessary to obtain oral depositions or to submit written
interrogatories. As currently practiced, discovery may be supervised by the court or by court-appointed federal magistrates. 9 The lack of direct authority by federal magistrates over
7. Discovery orders are often ambiguous both in terms of the scope and
of the deadline for compliance, making it difficult for the court to find a violation regardless of the culpability threshold employed. See notes 68-70 infra and
accompanying text. Contributing to lax administration of discovery are the
Federal Rules' highly discretionary approach to discovery administration, see
note 70 infra; the lack of supplemental local court rules that could force more
rigorous discovery administration, see notes 78-79 infra and accompanying textand limitations on the powers of federal magistrates, who often supervise the
pretrial discovery process, see notes 72-75 infra and accompanying text.
8. Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger, National Conference on the
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, in St.
Paul, Minnesota (Apr. 7, 1976), reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 83, 91, 95 (1976).
9. United States magistrates are untenured federal judicial officers who
assist district judges most frequently in the areas of pretrial proceedings, administrative review, and minor criminal offenses. Their status is comparable to
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pretrial discovery,' 0 combined with innocent as well as intentional" delays by attorneys have often made discovery a chaotic process. As a result, courts have used discovery sanctions
more frequently to promote judicial efficiency.12
A.

RuLE 37: AuTHo rrY FOR DIsCOvERY SANCTIONS

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules is the main statutory enforce3
ment mechanism of the pretrial discovery process.1 Under the
4
scheme adopted in the rule,1 an aggrieved party must first
that of bankruptcy judges. See Note, Article III Constraintsand the Expanding
Civil Jurisdictionof FederalMagistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.$. 1023,
1025-27 (1979).
Magistrate supervision has increasingly become a distinctive feature of
pretrial discovery. During the twelve months that ended June 30, 1979, magistrates conducted 24,231 civil pretrial conferences for judges of the federal district courts. At least two full-time magistrates now serve in each of the 25
largest district courts. ADmNwISTrTvE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 129, 133 (1979).
10. District courts retained authority over the disposition of pretrial matters under the Federal Magistrate Act of 1968, § 101, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1976 &
Supp. II 1978). The Act provides for de novo review by the district court of any
findings or recommendations made by the magistrates. Id. § 636(b)(1)(C).
This statutory authority constitutes the major difference between pretrial discovery supervision by district judges and magistrates. For a federal district
judge's view on judicial supervision of discovery proceedings see Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A JudicialPerspective, 67 CALIF. I- REv. 264 (1979).
11. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 100 S. Ct. 2455 (1980) (sanctions
imposed on lawyers who unreasonably extend court proceedings).
12. In a survey of published opinions over a period of nearly three years
from January, 1975, through October, 1977, 75% of the 48 district court opinons
that considered the imposition of discovery sanctions stated that some form of
sanction was appropriate. Comparison of this figure with other studies suggests that the published opinions are representative of the total group of determinations considering the imposition of discovery sanctions. See Werner,
Survey of Discovery Sanctions, 1979 ARiz. ST. LJ. 299, 310-12.
13. Rule 37 is the exclusive source of sanctions for noncompliance with a
court's production order. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958). Arguably, this does
not mean rule 37 is the exclusive source of all discovery sanctions. Two alternative sources of authority for controlling discovery abuse are currently available to federal courts. First, a court has statutory authority to assess a penalty
against an attorney for unreasonably increasing the costs of litigation. See 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (1976). Although the scope of the statute is broad enough to encompass the increased costs of litigation caused by unreasonable resistance to
discovery, the statute has rarely been invoked by the courts to limit discovery
abuse. See Werner, supra note 12, at 322-23. Second, a federal judicial district
may arguably create additional discovery sanctions through local rules, so long
as these new sanctions are not inconsistent with those enumerated in rule 37.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 83.

14. The rulemakers structured the discovery process on a cooperative
model as a party-initiated and controlled procedure to reduce the costs of court
management of discovery. See Note, Standardsfor the Imposition of Discovery
Sanctions,27 ME. L. REv. 247,248-49 (1975). It was recognized at the same time,
however, that judicial intervention was sometimes necessary to compel re-
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move for an order to compel discovery.15 If a party fails to obey
the order, rule 37 provides that the court may establish designated facts, 16 exclude claims and defenses,' 7 strike pleadings,18
or end the litigation either by dismissing a plaintiff's action or
by entering a default judgment against a defendant.19 Alternatively, the court can treat noncompliance as contempt, 20 or apply any other sanction considered "just."21 If the noncomplying
parties inexcusably fail to attend their own deposition, or do
not respond to properly served interrogatories or requests for
inspection of documents, the court may impose any of these
sanctions without a motion to compel.22 Regardless of the specific sanction imposed, the court can assess expenses, including
attorney's fees, to the party or attorney losing the motion.2

B.

REQUISITE CULPABILITY FOR IMPOSITION OF DISCOVERY

SANCTIONS

Although rule 37 does not clearly specify the degree of culpability required before discovery sanctions are imposed, a
sponses to legitimate discovery requests when the parties failed to agree. Id.at

264.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a). Rule 26(c) protective orders are available to parties against whom discovery is sought, and prevent the vexatious and improper
use of orders to compel discovery. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c).
16. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b) (2) (A).
-17. Id. 37(b) (2) (B).
18. Id. 37(b) (2) (C).
19. Id.
20. Id. 37(b) (2) (D).
21. Id. 37(b)(2).
22. When a party, given proper notice, fails to appear at his own deposition, or fails to serve answers to rule 33 interrogatories, or fails to serve a written response to a rule 34 request for inspection, the court in which the action is
pending may make any just order in regard to the failure, including those from
the list in rule 37(b) (2). The party failing to act may be assessed for reasonable expenses caused by the failure, unless the court finds substantial justification for the failure or other circumstances which make the award unjust. Id.
37(d). See Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1126 (5th Cir.) (entry
of default judgment against Swiss corporation not an abuse of discretion where
deponent, a corporate officer, willfully failed to appear for deposition by plaintiff, United States Government), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970). For subdivision 37(d) to be applicable, there must be a complete failure to make discovery.
See, e.g., Israel Aircraft Indus., Ltd. v. Standard Precision, 559 F.2d 203, 208 (2d
Cir. 1977); Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989, 995 (8th Cir. 1975).
23. Expenses are awarded under rule 37 for three main types of noncompliance: first, failure to afford discovery under rule 30 (oral depositions), rule 31
(depositions upon written questions), rule 33 (interrogatories to parties), and
rule 34 (production of documents and requests for inspection), which necessitates a motion for an order compelling discovery (FED. R Crv. P. 37(a) (4)); second, failure to comply with an order compelling-discovery (Id. 37(b)(2)(E));
and third, failure to attend a party's own deposition, to serve answers to rule 33
interrogatories, or to resond to a rule 34 request for inspection (Id. 37(d)).
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shift in the permissible culpability threshold has occurred as
attitudes concerning discovery sanctions have changed. A review of the forty-year history of rule 37 and an evaluation of the
current implementation of the rule reveal three alternative culpability thresholds that justify the imposition of litigation-ending sanctions: (1) conventional intent; (2) extreme or gross
negligence; and (3) ordinary negligence.
1.

The Conventional Wisdom: The Intent Threshold

a.

Rule 37 as Promulgated

Immediately after rule 37 was promulgated in 1938, most
lower federal courts believed that the rule required willful noncompliance with a discovery order before a sanction could be
imposed. 24 The dominant view was that the purpose of discovery sanctions should be remedial and specific: to compensate
the injured party or to enforce specific compliance from the
noncomplying party.25 Any deterrent effect on litigants other
than the immediate parties was only incidental.26 Though
courts often differed on how discovery problems should be analyzed under this remedial orientation, 27 the results were nevertheless uniform. Because litigation-ending sanctions were
inconsistent with a remedial goal, considerable restraint was
exercised in imposing the severest of the rule 37 sanctionsdismissal of the action and entry of default.28 When such sanctions were imposed, appellate courts often reversed, using an
29
abuse of discretion standard of review.
24. "Rule 37 sometimes refers to a 'failure' to afford discovery and at other
times to a 'refusal' to do so. Taking note of this dual terminology, courts have
imported into 'refusal' a requirement of 'willfulness."' Advisory Committee
Note, FED. R. Crv. P. 37, 48 F.R.D. 487, 538 (1970).
25. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Academy Moving & Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d 858 (5th
Cir. 1970); Robison v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1966).
26. The amendment of rule 37 in 1970 left this remedial orientation unchanged but the rule was toughened by requiring trial courts to tax costs upon
the party losing the motion unless that party could demonstrate that his position was substantially justified. See 48 F.R.D. 487, 534-38 (proposed amendments
to FED. R. Crv. P. 37(a) (4), (b) (2), (d), as amended March 30, 1979). Though
this amendment promoted compensatory ends, the main purpose was to discourage resort to judicial process to enforce discovery. See Note, The Emerging
Deterrence OrientationIn The Imposition Of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HaRv. L
REV. 1033, 1040-41 (1978).
27. See notes 30-33 infra and accompanying text.
28. See Note, supra note 26, at 1038.
29. See, e.g., Sapiro v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 452 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir.
1971) (per curiam); B.F. Goodrich Tire Co. v. Lyster, 328 F.2d 411, 416 (5th Cir.
1964); Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 670 (2d Cir. 1957).
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b. Societe Internationale
The impetus to revise rule 37 originated in 1958 with the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Societe Internationale pour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers.3 0 The Court held that the plaintiff could not be subjected
to rule 37 sanctions when its failure to comply with the lower
court's discovery order was "due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner."31 The Court's use of
these alternative criteria to describe the requisite culpability
for the imposition of severe discovery sanctions had two implications beyond its immediate holding. First, use of the term
"fault," though undefined, 32 appeared to indicate the lower
boundary of a permissible culpability range beyond which noncompliance could not be sanctioned by dismissal or default.
Second, the Court's use of the term "willfulness" in addition to
the term "fault" implied that a severe discovery sanction could
33
be imposed for a less-than-intentional failure to obey.
30. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). Societe Internationale, a Swiss corporation, had
brought suit in federal district court against the Attorney General and the
Treasurer of the United States for the recovery of assets seized in the United
States during World War II under the Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, § 5,
40 Stat. 415 (1917) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1976)). It was the government's defense that Societe Internationale was a holding company intimately connected with I.G. Farbenindustrie, a German corporation, and
therefore was an "enemy" under the terms of the Act. 357 U.S. at 199. To support this contention, the government obtained a discovery order from the district court requiring plaintiff to produce a large number of the records of a
Swiss banking firm. Id. at 199-200. Swiss law prohibited, under criminal penalty, the disclosure of these records, and the Swiss government confiscated
them. Id. at 200. Through the efforts of the plaintiff, over 190,000 documents
were released by the Swiss authorities and arrangements had been made for
neutral parties to inspect the remaining banking records. Id. at 203. Nevertheless, the district court directed final dismissal of the action under rule 37(b) (2)
for noncompliance with its production order. Id. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court decision. Id. The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings. Id. at 213.
31. 357 U.S. at 212.
32. Cine Fourty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir. 1979) (suggesting that "fault" must have a
meaning independent of '%villfulness" and "bad faith" unless the Supreme
Court chose its words carelessly in Societe Internationale).
33. But see Werner, Survey of Discovery Sanctions, 1979 Aiz. ST. L.J. 299,
315 (stating that Societe Internationaleheld willful noncompliance necessary
for dismissal or default sanction). As late as 1974, some courts interpreted Societe Internationaleas requiring some element of willfulness or conscious disregard before dismissal of an action for noncompliance with a discovery order.
See, e.g., Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 709 (2d Cir. 1974). Other courts, however,
recognized that the mere failure to respond was sufficient for the imposition of
lesser sanctions. See, e.g., Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 231, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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c.

The 1970 Revisions

Rule 37 was revised in 1970 with the two-fold intention of
refining and updating the discovery sanction provisions. Noting
the Societe Internationaledicta, the rulemakers substituted the
term "failure" for the term "refusal" throughout the text, and
thus negated federal court decisions interpreting "refusal" as
meaning willful or intentional noncompliance. 34 The
rulemakers, refining the triple criteria of Societe Internationale,
introduced proportionality between the severity of the sanction
that could be imposed and the degree of culpability of the noncomplying party.35 On the whole, the 1970 revisions reinforced
the prevailing remedial interpretation of rule 37. While negligent noncompliance might justify lesser sanctions, "intent" remained a prerequisite to the imposition of litigation-ending
discovery sanctions.
d.

National Hockey League

In National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,
Inc.,36 the Supreme Court went beyond the traditional wisdom
that parties will comply in the future, given one more chance,
and stated flatly that the unconditional imposition of sanctions
is necessary to deter "other parties to other lawsuits" from feeling free "to flout other discovery orders of other district
courts."

37

The language of Societe Internationale does not appear to support this view.
See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
34. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 24, at 539.
35. The advisory committee's comment to 37(d) emphasized the greater
flexibility in the choice of sanctions brought about by the elimination of "willful" failure to comply as a requirement. Flexibility would also result from the
use of "light" sanctions for negligent failure to comply. The advisory committee suggested that "light" sanctions of fees and expenses, but not "severe"
sanctions or dismissal of default, would be appropriate when the failure to obey
was due to "counsel's ignorance of Federal practice" or counsel's "Preoccupation with another aspect of the case." Id. at 541-42.
36. 427 U.S. 639 (1976). Characterizing the counsel's failure to answer interrogatories as "'callous disregard' of their responsibilities," the trial judge
dismissed the plaintiffs' multidistiict antitrust suit. Id. at 643. On appeal, the
Third Circuit reversed the dismissal by finding "'extenuating factors,"' noting
a lack of bad faith on the part of the plaintiffs' counsel. Id. at 641. The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the dismissal Id.
at 643.
37. Id. at 643.
[T] he most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or
rule must be available to the district court in appropriate cases, not
merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant
such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.
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Although National Hockey League signals a shift away
from the traditional intent standard, the Court's decision does
not completely reject the conventional wisdom of the intent
threshold. The position taken in the advisory committee notes
to the 1970 revisions of rule 37-that ultimate discovery sanctions are not justifiable absent a finding of willful violation of a
discovery order-appears to remain the predominant view even
after the National Hockey League endorsement of general de38
terrence.
Proponents of the intent threshold view National Hockey
League as irrelevant to the culpability threshold question; they
view the case merely as an encouragement to lower courts to
abandon the lenient practices of the past. Proponents of the intent threshold support their view by asserting that this standard achieves the proper balance between competing interests
and equities. They believe that the societal interest in generally deterring all conduct that tends to impede discovery
should be subordinate to the individual's interest in a decision
on the merits in cases of careless failure to comply with discovery orders.
Recognizing that dilatory discovery tactics were having an
adverse effect on the ultimate objectives of fairness and efficiency embodied in the Federal Rules, commentators have gen39
erally approved the National Hockey League decision.
Nevertheless, unlike intent threshold proponents, some observers would not limit ultimate sanctions to willful violators. One
commentator, reading National Hockey League broadly, advocates the use of ultimate sanctions even when discovery noncompliance is less than intentional.40 Adopting this tougher
attitude toward discovery noncompliance, 4 1 at least one federal
42
court has also begun to abandon the remedial rationale.
Id.
38. See, e.g., Renfrew, supra note 10, at 276; Werner, supra note 12, at 319;
Note, supra note 26, at 1050.
The advisory committee view is compatible with the National Hockey
League opinion, see National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,
Inc., 427 U.S. at 643, since the Court, while clearly urging lower courts to impose
ultimate sanctions more frequently to deter future discovery noncompliance,
did not consider whether the cost of such impositions should be placed on lessthan-intentional violators. See Note, supra note 26, at 1050. Further, the recitation of facts in the National Hockey League opinion left little doubt that the
Court considered plaintiffs' discovery noncompliance to be intentional. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. at 640-41.
39. See Renfrew, supra note 18, at 275; Note, supra note 26, at 1055.
40. See Note, supra note 26, at 1047.
41. See id. at 1044.
42. See, e.g., Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pic-
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Courts are increasingly accepting the idea that it is proper to
impose sanctions to achieve a general deterrent effect beyond
43
the parties to the instant suit.
2.

The Affanato/Cine Position: The Gross Negligence
Threshold

Two United States courts of appeals have held that gross
negligence in failing to comply with discovery orders is a sufficient culpability standard for the imposition of the most severe
rule 37 sanctions. Both courts explicitly justified their decisions on the general deterrent rationale authorized by the National Hockey League Court. In Affanato v. Merrill Brothers,44
the First Circuit affirmed a district court's entry of a default
judgment that had been imposed when the defendant in a tort
action failed to answer interrogatories. 45 Characterizing the defendant's attorney's conduct as a "near total dereliction of professional responsibility," the circuit court declared the
litigation-ending sanction to be within the discretionary power
of the trial court because the noncompliance went "Well beyond ordinary negligence." 46
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Cine
Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures
4 7
Corp.,
a private antitrust action. The Second Circuit panel
found that in light of the plaintiff's attorneys' grossly negligent
failure to obey discovery orders, the district court could bar the
plaintiff's evidence under rule 37(b)(2)(B)4a-in effect, a distures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1066-68 (1979); see notes 47-55 infra and accompany-

ing text.

43. To a great extent this change in attitude came about in the wake of a
recomposition of the federal caseload. Not only has the aggregate number of
cases brought into federal district courts increased markedly, but the nature of
these cases has grown more complex. Multiparty litigation, class actions, multidistrict suits, and antitrust actions typically involve complex factual problems
that require greater use of discovery. Additionally, because complex actions
tend to be harder fought, parties will more often involve the court in resolving
discovery disputes. See Note, supra note 26, at 1044-45.
44. 547 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1977).
45. Id. at 139-40. The failure was apparently due to defendant's counsel,
who was allowed to continue handling the case despite having left the Massachusetts firm representing the defendant and having established a new residence in Maine. Id. at 141. The district court's discovery orders were
dispatched to Maine, but the attorney ignored them. Id. The attorney's former
law firm, trusting in the abilities of its old associate, did not inquire into the
progress of the case. Id.
46. Id. at 141.
47. 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979).
48. Plaintiff's counsel had failed to obey oral discovery orders issued by
the United States magistrate in charge of the case. These oral court orders re-
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missal of the action. 49
Both the First Circuit in Affanato and the Second Circuit
in Cine specifically rejected the intent threshold. The Cine
court, in particular, directly rebutted the contentions of the intent threshold proponents. Although the intent threshold proponents would limit National Hockey League's policy of
general deterrence to the facts of the case itself (i.e., to cases in
which noncompliance was clearly an intentional trial tactic),o
the Cine court interpreted this policy more broadly. The court
believed NationalHockey League required "strict adherence to
the 'responsibilities counsel owe to the Court and to their opponents.' "51 Having cast the major significance of NationalHockey League in these broader, more utilitarian terms, the Cine
court felt free to impose litigation-ending sanctions to deter
even nonintentional breaches of these responsibilities to promote "strict adherence." 52 In addition, the Cine court rejected
the argument that only intentional, calculated discovery noncompliance could be effectively deterred. 53 Although conceding
that inability to comply with discovery orders could not be deterred,54 the court concluded that "[n] egligent, no less than in55
tentional, wrongs are fit subjects for general deterrence."
quired that interrogatories relating to damages be answered by the plaintiff.
Id. at 1064-65. Believing plaintiff's noncompliance to be willful, the magistrate
recommended to the district court that under rule 37(b) the plaintiff be precluded from introducing evidence with respect to damages-a sanction tantamount to dismissal. Id. at 1065. On the district judge's motion, the case was
certified for an interlocutory appeal. Id. The district judge refused to dismiss
on the ground that willful disobedience could not be found in the absence of
written discovery orders. A three-member panel of the Second Circuit, following the Affanato rationale, found plaintiffs counsel's conduct to be grossly negligent. Id. at 1067.
49. Id. at 1064. As the Cine result demonstrates, use of the terms
"lightest" and "severest" in relation to rule 37(b) sanctions is somewhat misleading. Depending on the circumstances, "lesser" sanctions can achieve
equally harsh results. The exclusion by the court of a decisive element of a
party's claim or defense may be as effective as direct dismissal of the action or
entry of default judgment. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481
F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974). It is a least arguable
that the same reasoning which constrains the use of litigation-ending sanctions
applies to other sanctions having a comparable effect. See Note, upra note 26,
at 1041 n.52.
50. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427
U.S. at 640-41.
51. 602 F.2d at 1067 (quoting National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. at 640).
52. 602 F.2d at 1067.
53. Id. See generally note 67 infra and accompanying text.
54. 602 F.2d at 1066 (quoting Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. at 212).
55. 602 F.2d at 1067. Indeed, the criminal codes of many states permit pun-
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Courts such as Affanato and Cine that have adopted a
gross negligence culpability threshold differ from the intent
threshold proponents in their view of the proper balance of the
equities in cases of discovery noncompliance. To these courts,
the individual unfairness of denying a decision on the merits is
outweighed by the supposedly greater general interest in the
efficient administration of discovery. Theoretically, future litigants will be spared the delayed justice that is generated by
noncompliance, whether the noncompliance is intentional or
merely grossly negligent.
3.

The OrdinaryNegligence Threshold

Affanato and Cine represent an emerging trend in the
caselaw, 56 and since National Hockey League, no discernible
line of cases has arisen in opposition to the position taken by
these circuit courts. 5 7 A third position may be hypothesized,
however. Although no court has so held, open-ended language
in both Affanato and Cine suggests that even ordinary negliishment of "criminal negligence" in a variety of contexts under a general deterrence rationale. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(3) (a) (West 1970); COLO.REV.
STAT. § 18-3-106 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.071 (West 1976); HAWAII REV.STAT.
§§ 707-703, 704 (1976); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-7 (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.324 (West 1968); MIN. STAT. § 609.21 (1978); Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.016(1),
(4), (5) (1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.00(3), 125.10 (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16-03 (1976); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.07 (Vernon 1974).
56. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hummell, 587 F.2d 862, 866 (7th Cir. 1978) (dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders upheld without a finding of willfulness).
57. Though the mandate of National Hockey League has not been challenged as such, some appellate courts have set aside litigation-ending discovery
sanctions imposed by trial courts in the interest of preserving judicial discretion and maintaining fairness in the discovery process. See, e.g., United Artists
Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979) (trial court's default judgment
set aside when pro se defendant refused to answer questions at deposition due
to confusion and ignorance as to attorney's advice in regard to fifth amendment
privilege; trial judge should have explained to defendant how and under what
circumstances he could legitimately claim the privilege); Thomas v. United
States, 531 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1976) (trial court's dismissal with prejudice of
plaintiff's tax refund action and entry of judgment for government's counterclaim reversed when plaintiff asserted fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination in response to court order compelling him to answer government's interrogatories; dismissal sanction was an abuse of discretion which denied plaintiff the opportunity to show tax assessment was erroneous, arbitrary,
and capricious).
Other appellate courts have followed National Hockey League's deterrence
rationale without approving the gross negligence position of Affanato and Cine
by characterizing the noncomplying party's conduct from the outset as "willful." See, e.g., Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 611 F.2d 32, 3536 (3rd Cir. 1979); G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency of San Jose, 577
F.2d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 1978); Securities & Exchange Commission v. Wencke, 577
F.2d 619, 622 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:137

gence might be a legitimate target for deterrence under the National Hockey League rationale.5 8
An ordinary negligence culpability threshold is logically defensible and, indeed, may be the inevitable outgrowth of the Affanato/Cine position. Since a finding of negligent failure to
comply with a discovery order presupposes "fault," the ordinary negligence threshold would comport with Societe Internationale's mandated minimum culpability standard.5 9 A
negligence threshold would extend the deterrence rationale to
its logical limits 6 0 and would be consistent with NationalHock58. "What is important is that the conduct of counsel with which defendant is chargeable consisted of a series of episodes of nonfeasance which
amounted, in sum, to a near total dereliction of professional responsibility by
the associate in the law firm defendant had retained." Affanato v. Merrill Bros.,
547 F.2d at 141. The Second Circuit panel in Cine picked up on this theme:
The principal objective of the general deterrent policy of National
Hockey is strict adherence to the 'responsibilities counsel owe to the
Court and to their opponents,' 427 U.S. at 640, 96 S. Ct. at 2780. Negligent, no less than intentional, wrongs are fit subjects for general deterrence.
Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d at
1067 (citation omitted). The traditional standard of culpability used to determine liability in professional malpractice is ordinary negligence-the due care
shown by a member of the profession having the requisite knowledge, training,
and skill. See Houser, Legal Malpractice-An Overview, 55 N.D. L REv. 185,
205 (1979); Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of
Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L REv. 281, 293 (1979).
59. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
60. Indeed, in Link v. Wabash Railroad, 370 U.S. 626 (1962), the United
States Supreme Court found no denial of due process in a dismissal under rule
41(b) of a personal injury action for plaintiffs attorney's unintentional and
probably not grossly negligent failure to appear for trial. Id. at 633.
Plaintiff's action had been protracted for over six years. Id. at 627. A pretrial conference had been scheduled by the district court at Hammond, Indiana,
for 1:00 p.m., October 12, 1960. Id. Notice by mail of the scheduled conference
had been sent to the counsel for both parties, but on the morning of October 12
plaintiff's attorney was in Indianapolis, Indiana, preparing papers to fie in the
Indiana Supreme Court. Id. At 10:45 a.m. plaintiffs attorney telephoned the
district judge's secretary to inform the judge that he could not travel the 160
miles from Indianapolis to Hammond in-time for the 1:00 p.m. conference. Id.
at 627-28. Plaintiffs attorney requested that the conference date be reset for
the following afternoon, or anytime thereafter. Id. Counsel did not appear for
the 1:00 p.m. conference, and the district judge, after waiting two hours, on his
own motion dismissed the action with prejudice. Id. at 628-29.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Id. at 629. On certiorari, the Supreme Court also affirmed, Justice Harlan for the majority noting
that counsel's failure to appear was but one instance of a pattern of behavior
amounting to failure to prosecute. Id. at 633-34.
Justice Black, dissenting, thought the majority was harsh and unrealistic in
punishing the client for the counsel's errors on the basis of a theory of agency.
Id. at 643-48. Yet Link remains the leading case standing for the proposition
that "the acts and omissions of counsel are normally wholly attributable to the
client." Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.,
602 F.2d at 1068 n.10.
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ey League's general policy of combatting delays in federal
courts. Moreover, once the propriety of the Affanato/Cine
threshold is accepted, it is difficult to draw the line at gross
negligence. Analogous case law attempting to distinguish gross
from ordinary negligence 6 ' demonstrates that this is often a
meaningless distinction. There is, perhaps, more than a measure of truth in Baron Rolfe's remark that gross negligence is
but ordinary negligence "with the addition of a vituperative
62
epithet."
C.

PROBLEMS WrrH A REDUCED CuLPABnrY THRESHOLD

1.

The DeterrenceRationale of National Hockey League

The question of what effect National Hockey League
should have on the culpability threshold for the imposition of
ultimate discovery sanctions must be analyzed in terms of the
decision's underlying rationale: deterrence. In essence, the deterrence orientation of National Hockey League represents a
recognition that the overall efficiency of federal administration
of civil justice demands a reduction in the delay caused by discovery noncompliance, and that some litigants must suffer a severe sanction in order to increase this overall efficiency. Those
who delay discovery must be precluded from asserting their
claims or defending themselves against the claims of other parties even though they could have prevailed on the merits.63
Prior to NationalHockey League, this deterrence rationale
was given little weight. The remedial rationale of the early
61. Negligence cannot be treated in the abstract.
"Gross" negligence is a relative term that does not lend itself to precise
definition automatically resolving every case.... [T] he modem trend
is to reject the common-law divisions of negligence into "gross," "ordinary" and "slight," as having "no distinctive meaning or importance in
the law," and tending to uncertainty and confusion. .
Oliver v. Kantor, 122 N.J.Eq. 528, 532, 6 A.2d 205, 207 (1939).
62. Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, 116, 152 Eng. Rep. 737, 739 (1843).
63. Courts may often suspect that noncomplying parties would not prevail
on the merits in any event. Wealthy parties have used dilatory tactics to increase the cost of litigation for parties with inferior financial resources, thereby
forcing unfair settlements. See generally Janofsky, The "Big Case" A "Big
Burden" on Our Courts,66 A.B.A. J. 848 (1980). One commentator suggests that
suits are often begun without a good faith belief by the client or his counsel
that a claim exists; the complaint is filed simply to gain access to discovery.
The party then uses discovery, not to find evidence supporting his claim, but to
discover if any valid claim exists at all. Should the defendant attempt to use
discovery, the plaintiff might delay to gain additional time to discover evidence
that would support a claim. Under these circumstances, dilatory tactics may'
lead judges to believe that the noncomplying party has something to hide. See
Renfrew, supra note 10, at 266-67.
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cases focused on the injury that noncompliance inflicted on the
discovering party. Ultimate sanctions could be imposed under
a narrow remedial rationale only when the injury was so great
that a lesser discovery sanction could not return the parties in
the instant litigation to equal positions. Thus, under the remedial rationale, the degree of culpability was irrelevant to the
sanction selection process. No matter how intentional the noncompliance may have been, ultimate sanctions would be illogical so long as there was a lesser sanction that would return the
parties' positions to equilibrium.64 Courts, prior to National
Hockey League, rarely employed ultimate sanctions even in
cases of clearly intentional discovery abuse.65 Those cases in
which litigation-ending sanctions were employed can be explained either as situations in which the discovering party had
been so prejudiced by noncompliance that an ultimate sanction
64. Courts that decided discovery abuse cases under the remedial purpose
rationale necessarily focused on a narrow balancing of the interests of the parties to the instant lawsuit. In deciding which discovery sanction to apply,
courts tended to conceptualize this general process under two judicial tests:
the "least restrictive alternative" and the "balancing of interests." See generally Note, supra note 26; Note, supra note 14.
Neither 6f these concepts originated in the area of discovery procedure.
The least restrictive alternative concept was built on an established body of
case law that invalidated regulatory legislation infringing on important interests more than was necessary to achieve an otherwise legitimate goal. See, e.g.,
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (invalidation of state statute requiring
schoolteachers to disclose their membership in organizations); Dean Milk Co.
v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (invalidation of local milk regulation that
infringed too broadly on interstate commerce). See generally Wurmuth &
Murkin, The Doctrine of the ReasonableAlternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964).
In the discovery context, the rule developed that courts should impose the
lightest sanction consistent with the effective administration of discovery procedures. For example, Gordon v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 427 F.2d 578
(D.C. Cir. 1970), and Von Der Heyt v. Rogers, 251 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1958), were
remanded when the records on appeal did not reveal the basis for the selection
of severe sanctions, lending support to the proposition that it is reversible error
to neglect to consider milder sanctions before a severe sanction is imposed.
Note, supra note 14, at 266-67.
Courts came to apply the balancing of interests test by balancing the discovering party's need for the requested information with the recalcitrant
party's practical ability to comply with the order. Courts also considered the
effect that any sanction would have in resolving the case on the merits. Severe
rule 37 sanctions were increasingly applied as the balance tipped further in
favor of the discovering party. This balancing process, designed to reach the
appropriate sanction, is closely analogous to that mandated by rule 26(b) to determine the propriety of issuing initial discovery orders themselves. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947).
Both of these tests, however, fail to consider the interests of the courts
themselves as representatives of the public interest in the resolution of discovery impasses-a consideration mandated by NationalHockey League.
65. See notes 24-29 supra and accompanying text.
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was the only just solution, or as situations reflecting unspoken
punitive purposes.
Since National Hockey League, courts have found a remedial approach to be impractical. It would be difficult to calculate the costs that discovery noncompliance inflicts on those
who would have had speedier access to the federal courts but
for the delay. Similarly, it is impossible to identify those who
are injured, since such injury is characterized only as a generalized injury to the public's interest in efficient administration of
civil justice. Unlike the purely remedial rationale, the deterrent
purpose of National Hockey League directly implicates the
question of the appropriate culpability threshold, because
wholly innocent noncompliance will not be deterred. 66 Moreover, some observers consider calculated, intentional behavior
to be the most susceptible to deterrence. 67 The unresolved issue after National Hockey League is whether behavior that
falls between total innocence and intent-usually termed negligence-warrants ultimate discovery sanctions.
2.

The Breakdown of Deterrence

Certainty that a particular form of behavior will result in
the imposition of a severe sanction is both the essence of general deterrence and a prerequisite to a perception of fairness. 68
The essential difficulty with any of the three alternative culpability thresholds-intent, gross negligence, and ordinary negligence-lies in the absence of clear standards of conduct for
litigants in discovery.69 The discretionary power of the federal
courts to leave indefinite the ultimate deadline past which litigation is brought to an end through dismissal or default, contributes to this uncertanty.70 In addition, the problem of
66. See Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1979).
67. See G. ERENIUS, CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND INrDIVIDUALrrY 118-19 (1976).
Predictions about the deterrent effect of criminal penalties may not correspond
exactly to predictions about the deterrent effect of civil discovery sanctions.
68. See Renfrew, supra note 10, at 281. The amount of scholarly literature
on the general deterrence theory is enormous and continually expanding. For
selected references emphasizing the dependance of effective deterrence on the
severity of the sanction and the certainty of the severe sanction's imposition,
see G. ERENrus, note 67 supra, at 118-19; Andenaes, General Prevention Revisited: Research and Policy Implications, 66 3. Cmm. L & CRIMINOLOGY 338, 362
(1975); Singer, PsychologicalStudies of Punishment,58 CALIF. L REV. 405, 414,
417 (1970). See generally A. EWING, THE MoRALrY OF PUNISHMENT 50-58 (1929).
69. This was a direct consequence of the party-initiated, minimally courtsupervised concept of discovery originally embodied in the Federal Rules. See
note 14 supra and accompanying text.
70. Normally rule 37 requires a request for an order to compel discovery
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defining culpability is exacerbated when federal magistrates
7
supervise discovery. 1
Three characteristics of magistrate supervision have encouraged uncertainty. First, the magistrate in charge of the
pretrial discovery period lacks authority to impose sanctions
upon a noncomplying party under current law.7 2 The magistrate instead recommends to the district court that a sanction
be imposed on the recalcitrant party, and the district trial judge
has the discretion to follow the magistrate's recommendation,
ignore it, or devise a different remedy. 73 Under these circumstances, where the district court essentially reviews the case de
novo,74 the parties often are uncertain that the magistrate's
sanction recommendation will ultimately be imposed. Indeed,
the reported cases would indicate that magistrates' recommendations are occasionally ignored by the district courts. 75 Thus,
parties have little incentive to take magistrates' warnings seriously. Second, magistrates are not required, and frequently
fail, to make a record of discovery orders and deadlines. 7 6 The
absence of definite written discovery orders provides numerous
opportunities for parties to fail to comply with discovery orders
while preventing district courts from determining if either
party is culpable. 77 Finally, there are few procedural guidelines
for magistrates to follow in pretrial discovery actions, particularly with regard to the extension of discovery deadlines. 78 The
result is a lack of uniformity in extensions, and a comcomitant
prior to a request for a sanction. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
This gives a recalcitrant discoveree a built-in second chance to delay at relatively little cost; if the judge conditions imposition of the ultimate sanction
upon further noncompliance, a third opportunity for dilatory conduct arises.
See Note, supra note 26, at 1037.
71. See, e.g., Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Picture
Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1064-65 (2d Cir. 1979) (magistrate recommended to district
judge that plaintiff be precluded under rule 37(b) from introducing evidence
with respect to damages; district judge refused to dismiss on grounds that Willful disobedience could not be found in the absence of written discovery orSee generally Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The
ders).
American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1329-30 (1975).
72. See 602 F.2d at 1065; note 9 supra and accompanying text.
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1976).
74. See id.
75. See note 71 supra.
76. See, e.g., 602 F.2d at 1064-65.
77. See id.
78. Such guidelines could be promulgated by the Judicial Conference of
the United States in a manner similar to the promulgation of guidelines for
misdemeanor trials conducted by federal magistrates. See, e.g., Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Misdemeanors Before United States Magistrates,85 F.R.D.
417 (1980).
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uncertainty as to the real significance of any particular deadline.

79

Many reforms designed to increase certainty in pretrial discovery have been implemented;s0 others have been recently
proposed; 8 1 and many more must be adopted before the requisite degree of certainty is achieved. Congress, however, took an
important step to increase certainty at the magistrate's level
when it enacted the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979,82 which replaced the original statutory source of federal magistrates' authority, the Federal Magistrate Act of 1968.83 The 1979 Act
explicitly authorizes federal districts to designate situations in
which magistrates may, at the parties' consent, render final
judgments in civil proceedings. 84 Some district courts had previously allowed consensual magistrate trials under the promulgation of local rules. 85 Favorable response to these
experimental programs led to the 1979 Act's uniform enabling
provisions. 86 The 1979 Act also sets forth guidelines for the con79. See note 70 supra.
80. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text. Effective August 1, 1980,
rules 26 and 37 of the Federal Rules were amended to clarify the duties of litigants in pretrial discovery. See 85 F.R.D. 521-44.
Three justices dissented, however, from the Supreme Court's recommendation of the new amendments. 85 F.R.D. at 521. Justice Powell, in a dissenting
statement, warned that these amendments, along with amendments to rules 33
and 34, fell short of the need for real reform in discovery procedure:
I simply believe that Congress' acceptance of these tinkering changes
will delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective reforms. The
process of change, as experience teaches, is tortuous and contentious.
Favorable congressional action on these amendments will create complacency and encourage inertia. Meanwhile, the discovery Rules will
continue to deny justice to those least able to bear the burdens of delay, escalating legal fees, and rising court costs.
85 F.R.D. at 523.
81. Congress has currently considered a delay sanctions bill (H.R. 4047,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. H3044 (1979)) which would amend section
1927 of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure statute (28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976)) to
require attorneys to personally pay for all expenses and attorney's fees caused
by egregious dilatory conduct delaying or increasing litigation costs. See 66
A.B.A. J. 709 (1980). The current law requires payment of only "excess costs."
Id. See note 13 supra.
The American Bar Association's proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct would also enlarge ethical rule prohibitions against dilatory procedural tactics in pretrial discovery. See 66 A.B. J. 709 (1980).
82. Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L No. 96-82, § 2, 93 Stat. 643 (1979)
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636).
83. Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 101, 82 Stat. 1113 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 636
(1976 & Supp. H 1978)).
84. Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2, 93 Stat. 643 (1979) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) (1)).
85. See Note, Article III Constraintsand the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction
of FederalMagistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE LJ. 1023, 1023-24 (1979).
86. Id.
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duct of consensual trials. For example, magistrates are authorized to begin a written record of the proceeding at the pretrial
stage,8 7 and the federal government is authorized to pay all the
costs. Previously, the party aggrieved by a consensual magistrate's trial could seek relief only in a de novo review by the
district court.88 The 1979 Act provides for a formal appeals
process that gives the aggrieved party the alternative of appeal89
ing to the district court or directly to the court of appeals.
Elimination of de novo review by the district courts of discovery disputes from the magistrate's level aids in reducing uncertainty in the sanctioning process.
These reforms, though welcome, are only a starting point in
the formation of a justiciable culpability threshold. To the extent that current discovery practice is still perceived as uncertain and indefinite, a new approach that brings discovery in the
federal courts closer to the deterrence goal of NationalHockey
League is needed. 90
Im.

PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER REFORM

The following proposals represent general suggestions for
the clarification of litigants' duties to the court in the discovery
phase of the lawsuit. Reforms should provide more detailed
guidelines for district judges and magistrates supervising pretrial discovery.
In light of previous experience, 91 rules 26(f) and 37(a)
should be amended by inserting appropriate language requiring written court orders for establishing discovery plans and for
compelling discovery. Written orders promote certainty in the
duty of litigants and their attorneys to aid courts in securing
"the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac92
tion."
The Federal Magistrate Act should also be amended to
make final discovery orders in magistrate pretrial proceedings
87. Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2, 93 Stat. 643 (1979) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) (7)).
88. Federal Magistrate Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 101, 82 Stat. 1107
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
89. Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2, 93 Stat. 643 (1976) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) (7).
90. See Perlman, The Federal Discovery Rules: A Look at New Proposals,
15 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 57, 99 (1979); Renfrew, supra note 10, at 264-67; Note,
supra note 26, at 1055; notes 8-12 supra and accompanying text.
91. See note 71 supra.
92. FED. R. Crv. P. 1.
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mandatory in all federal districts.93 In view of the staggering
growth of litigation in recent years, increasing the authority of
magistrates is a logical step in the transformation of the federal
magistrate system into a new tier of federal courts. 94 Final discovery authority for magistrates would provide the needed incentive for parties, attorneys, and district courts to take
magistrates' warnings seriously because they would know with
certainty that the magistrates' sanction recommendations
would be imposed.
In addition, local rules of court, applicable to both federal
district judges and magistrates, should be amended to clarify
the supervising judicial officer's procedures in imposing sanctions and thus to enhance the certainty of the sanctions. 95 A bifurcated procedural framework would offer several benefits. At
the first stage, the discovery process would be in its ideal state:
a party-initiated, consensual means of obtaining information.
The supervising judicial officer, in conjunction with the parties,
would prepare a discovery compliance schedule under rule
26(f). The schedule would list dates by which time the parties
would have to answer discovery requests, but the schedule
could be amended for subsequent discovery requests and unanticipated delays.
Such a discovery compliance schedule would be a memorial containing the terms of the parties' discovery agreement. A
party's failure to meet a scheduled deadline would therefore be
treated in the traditional manner. the noncomplying litigant
93. The proposed amendment could be worded thus:
Section 636(c) of title 28, United States Code, is amended(a) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (7) thereof as paragraphs (2) through (8), respectively; and
(b) by inserting the following new paragraph: (1) When specially
designated to exercise jurisdiction over pretrial civil proceedings
by the district court, a full-time United States magistrate or a
part-time United States magistrate has the authority to enter final
judgment in such pretrial proceedings, the lack of the parties'
consent to the magistrate's jurisdiction notwithstanding. Nothing
in this paragraph will be construed as a limitation of any party's
right to object to a magistrate trial in any other proceeding.
For discussions of the constitutional and policy ramifications of proposals to expand the power of magistrates, see Note, Masters and Magistratesin the Federal Courts, 88 HARv. L. REv. 779 (1975); Note, supra note 85.
94. See Note, supra note 85, at 1048-49. See generally Note, supra note 93.
95. The Federal Rules authorize each district court to adopt rules of practice not inconsistent with those rules and declare that in all cases not provided
for by rule the district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with the Federal Rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 83. The Federal Magistrate
Act grants district courts the authority to promulgate local rules to govern magistrate proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (4) (Supp. II 1980).
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would be afforded protection through rule 26(c) protective orders, while the aggrieved litigant could require compliance
through rule 37(a) court orders. Upon a party's failure to obey
a court order compelling discovery, the supervising judge or
magistrate would be free to impose any appropriate sanction
enumerated in rule 37. This lenient sanctioning pattern would
signify a deliberate attempt to induce parties to reach mutual
agreement. If parties could not agree on discovery matters,
then the judicial officer would assume a larger role in expediting the discovery process.
A second, less flexible, stage of discovery procedure would
be applicable whenever one or more of the litigants became intransigent. The supervising judicial officer would set the discovery deadlines listed in the discovery compliance schedule
after reviewing affidavits in which the parties would propose
and justify deadlines for discovery requests and answers. The
judge or magistrate would be allowed a measure of discretion
to reach realistic deadlines with a minimum of delay and expense. A party who allowed a deadline to expire without having obtained a protective order would be given one more
chance to comply if the judicial officer determined that compliance was necessary.
Lesser sanctions would be appropriate for initial noncompliance, although rare circumstances might demand that the litigation be terminated or that the litigation be continued
without any sanction applied. If the judicial officer determined
that a discovery request required an answer, that the noncomplying party had not sought or obtained a protective order, and
that the noncomplying party had been previously warned, the
case would then be ripe for the application of a dismissal or default judgment under rule 37(b) (2). Only under the most compelling circumstances would the litigation be allowed to
96
continue.
Implementation of these suggestions would provide the
greater certainty necessary to enhance fairness in imposing severe, litigation-ending sanctions. The proposed reforms would
make an ordinary negligence culpability threshold a practical
alternative by clarifying the litigants', and their attorneys', duty
to the courts, and would permit courts to follow the National
Hockey League directive to pursue a general deterrence pur96. Of course, a recalcitrant party would retain the right to appeal such a
decision to the district or circuit court. The traditional standard for reviewwhether the lower court abused its discretion-would be applicable.
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pose. Imposing ordinary negligence as the standard for discovery sanctions would provide the noncomplying party with a
meaningful remedy against his or her attorney if the attorney
negligently caused the delay. The discovery sanction culpablity standard would be the same as the culpability threshold for
the attorney's malpractice liability. Thus, the objections of
those who would hesitate to sanction the client for what might
be the attorney's obstructions are overcome. The Code of Professional Responsibility's requirement that attorneys accept no
greater workloads than they are capable of effectively pursuing
97
might also be strengthened.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts are becoming increasingly hostile toward dilatory tactics in complex
litigation. They have recognized that the liberalization of pretrial discovery has not been without negative side effects on
court efficiency. Uncertainty over the likelihood of the imposition of ultimate discovery sanctions, which aggravates this inefficiency, could well be reduced through the suggested
amendments and local rules proposed in this Note. Once the
duty of the attorney to the courts is clarified, the required degree of culpability for the imposition of litigation-ending sanctions is clear: it should be no more and no less than that
necessary to render attorneys liable to their client for malpractice-ordinary negligence. Until standards for attorneys in discovery are clarified, however, courts will continue to have
difficulty in justifying imposition of severe sanctions in any but
the clearest cases of intentional obstruction.

97.

See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-30 (1969) ("Em-

ployment should not be accepted by a lawyer when he is unable to render com")
petent service ....
The lawyer deciding whether to undertake a case must be able to judge
objectively whether he is capable of handling it and whether he can assume its burdens without prejudice to previous commitments.
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 AB.A.J. 1159,
1218 (1958).

